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errors are mine.1 Introduction: A brief survey of the literature
Recently, a fast growing body of literature is devoted to the
investigation of the impact of the provision of pUblic capital,
notable pUblic infrastructure, on the performance of the private
sector of the economy. There are two good reasons that justify
research efforts into this topic: since around 1975 in most OEeD
countries a serious decline in the rates of growth in productivity
has occurred which caused tremendous research efforts to uncover and
explain this productivity slowdown. A series of recently presented
papers make the neglect and low growth of pUblic infrastructure
investment at least partially responsible for the productivity
slowdown. A quite different motive for infrastructure research is to
be found in the need to reconstruct the former East European
countries. Apart from the poor equippment with pUblic infrastructure
capital it is estimated that at least 60% - 70% of their existing
public infrastructure facilities ranging from roads to
administrative buildings - are scrapped or completely outdated and
need intensive reconstruction at tremendous cost. Thus, information
on the contribution of public infrastructure capital to the
performance of the private economy is necessary to support and
direct the efficient allocation of public investment expenditures.
In addition, the problem of the impact of alternative financing
schemes on general economic conditions has to be addressed because'
most countries face tough budgetary restrictions.
Up to the present, in the public finance literature there is a
remarkable 'ignorance' with respect to the examination of the role
of public goods1 in the private production process whereas their
role as consumption goods are extensively dealt with. Notable
exceptions are the work of Arrow and Kurz (1970), and Grossman and
Lucas (1974). In their investigation of optimal fiscal policy, the
former include the benefits related to the provision of public
capital both in the consumption function as well as in the private
production function. The paper by Grossman and Lucas extends a
standard IS-LM model taking into account that pUblic goods enhance
private productivity. However, the role of public capital, or to be
more precise, the services rendered thereof, has always been of
1 The terms 'public capital' and 'public infrastructure'
will be used interchangable in section I and IIi section
III will give more precise definitions.
1central focus in the economic development literature under the
heading ,social overhead capital' where it is thought to be a
'conditio sine qua non' for economic development, see for example
Arnold (1992). Another line of literature in which public capital
has been a constant research topic is the regional and urban
science. within this field of economics, investment in public
infrastructure is regarded as a vehicle to foster regional growth,
see Biehl (1991) for a survey.
In the recently established applied infrastructure research two
competing approaches have been proposed. One line of literature
takes the 'production function approach' and regresses private input
productivity measures or private output on the usual variables
including among the regressors data on pUblic capital and check if
the latter variable turns out significant. Ratner (1983) has
probably been the first who examined such regressions using u. S.
data. Within the same framework Aschauer, (1989a, 1989b) estimated
the productivity effects of pUblic consumption expenditures as well
as of the military and non-military pUblic capital stock. In
addition, he estimated rather ad-hoc specified equations for privat
investment and the rate of return to private nonfinancial corporate
capital in order to examine the crowding out hypothesis and the
impact of pUblic capital on the demand for and the profitability of
private investment. Aschauer's evidence supports the idea that
public non-military capital enhances private productivity and
increases the rate of return to private capital and thus crowds in
private capital. The latter aspect is also supported by a more
recent study presented by Lynde (1992). A competing line of research
is constituted by the 'duality approach' which examines the impact
of public capital on the private economy by estimating a generalized
cost function introducing pUblic capital as a fixed unpaid
production factor recovering its productivity effect by applying
duality theory. The theoretical basis for this line of res~arch has
been established by Diewert (1986). The first empirical study that
applied duality theory to measure the economic benefits associated
with the provision of pUblic infrastructure, using a restricted
profit rather than a cost function, has been presented by Deno
(1988). More recent empirical studies use restricted cost function
to detect productivity effects of pUblic capital. Berndt and Hansson
(1991), using data for Sweden, Conrad and Seitz (1991, 1992), using
German data, Morrisson and Schwartz (1992), and Nadiri and Mamuenas
(1991) for the U. S. present empirical evidence strongly supporting
the productivity effect of public capital. However, negative results
2are reported by Holtz-Eakin (1991) for the U. s.
Almost all of the above mentioned infrastructure studies focus their
attention on two issues: The estimation of the shadow price of
pUblic capital and the examination of the impact pUblic capital has
on total factor productivity. The present study examines both
aspects only briefly as they are well documented in the papers
citied above. We direct our attention on the interrelationship
between public capital and the demand for private inputs, especially
private capital, shedding new light on the 'crowding out'
hypothesis. In section II we use a generalized cost function to
examine the impact pUblic capital has on private production cost and
the demand for private inputs. Special attention is devoted to the
effects of providing pUblic infrastructure capital on the demand for
private capital incorporating financing considerations. section III
introduces the econometric implementation of our model and comments
on the data used for the present study; empirical results are
presented in section IV. Finally, we summarize our conclusions,
comment on the shortcomings of our empirical approach and outline
prospects for further research.
2 The public capital hypothesis, crowding out and crowding in
Consider the cost function (1) of industry j, j =l, .•J:
(1) 'Vj=1,""J
which results from the minimization of the private production cost
Cj Wj"Lj + rj"Kj subject to the production function Yj
fj(Lj,Kj,t,G). Wj is the wage rate, r j is the user cost of private
capital, Yj i~ output and the time counter t represents technical
change. Public capital, G, appears as an argument in the private
cost function (1) as an unpaid2 fixed input. Differ~ntiating (1)
with respect to G yields the shadow price Sj associated with public
capital:
(2)
_ aCj ( wj ' r j' t, Yj , G)
aG
Sj denotes the change in private production cost in industry j if
2 A rigorous study should consider that firms pay for
investing in and running government capital by taxes.
3the pUblic capital stock G is expanded by one additional unit.
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to the variable t yields
insight into the impact pUblic capital has on total fac~or
productivity. If BSjjBt is >, = or < 0 than pUblic capital supports,
does not affect or disencourages technical progress. Note, that by
applying the envelope theorem, one can easily derive the property:
with fj,G denoting the marginal product of G and Cy = BCjjaYj
marginal cost. This relation provides a link between the 'production
function approach' and the 'duality approach' and can be used to
compare results derived from these quite different approaches. 3
Usually one expects that Sj ~ 0, that means that an increase in the
provision of public capital either leaves private cost unaffected
(Sj = 0) or results in cost savings (Sj > 0). This expectation
implies specific properties of the production function that is
primal to the cost function (1) with respect to the
sUbstitutionability andjor complementary of the various inputs:
Applying Shephard's Lemma to the cost function (1) yields the cost
minimizing conditional factor demand functions for private capital
and labour, K*j and L*j:
(3a)




aCj = L~ = Lj (Wj ' I j , t, Yjl G)
aWj
]
using these conditional factor demand functions, production cost can
be rewritten as:
(4)
Applying Shephard's Lemma to (4) yields:
3 The proof is quite simple: Let (i) V(.. ) = wL + rK +
A[Y - f(..)] be the Lagrangian to solve the cost
minimization problem. Note, that in the optimum A equals
marginal cost, Cy • Differentiating (i) with respect to
G yields BVjoG = -ABfjaG = -Sj = -CyofjoG, in the
optimum, that is at minimum cost.
4oK~ oL~
(5) Sj = - r ..---.l... - w.·---.l...
J oG J oG
I
which decomposes the cost changes associated with an increase in G
into adjustment effects on private labour and capital. SKj denotes
the response of the demand for private capital and SLj the response
of the demand for private labour in industry j to an increase in G.
Equation (5) reveals that an~ increase in the provision of pUblic
capital is always cost saving if all private inputs are substitutes
with respect to pUblic capital, that is SKj and SLj < O. However, if
one of the private inputs is complementary to the pUblic input cost
saving effects arise only if the substitutive effects upon the other
private inputs outweight the complementary effect. The cost of
producing the output volume Yj increase if all private inputs are
complementary to G or if complementary effects offset substitutive
effects.
The expectation that OCj/OG is negative4, that is that an increase
in G reduces private production cost, is based upon a simple analogy
to the case when private capital is taken to be fixed in the short
run. Assume private labour L, private capital K, and pUblic capital
G enter the private production function and that K is fixed in the
short run. The resulting short run variable cost function C =
C(w,K,Y,G) must have the property a~/oK < 0 because otherwise the
cost function C(....} would not be consistent with cost minimizing
behavior. Why should firms increase their capital stock if this
leads to an increase in cost given w, Y and G? Firms are free to
choose the level of K and therefore cost increasing adjustments of
K are irrational. But does this carryover to the variable G? Assume
that labour and pUblic capital are complements in which case an
increase in G increases the cost of producing the output volume Y -
given wand K - because more labour is required. As an example
consider government investment in public sewage disposal facilities
which asks for a more 'bureaucratic' handling of sewage disposal in
private firms. Firms cannot escape this cost increase because the
level of G is beyond their control. Thus, oC/oG > 0 can be fully in
accordance with cost minimizing behavior!
4 This expectation seems to be hold throughout the infra-
structure literature. Thus, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991,
p, 7) note "..in order for pUblic capital input to have
a meaningful context the cost function should be non-
increasing in g [the public capital stock]."
5Let us examine the response of the demand for private capital to an
increase in the provision of public capital in more detail. Totally
differentiating the conditional demand function for private capital
with respect to pUblic capital G yields a decomposition of the
adjustment of the private capital stock caused by additional
investment into pUblic capital:
(6) dKj = K'.. dWj + K'.. drj + K'.. dYj K'..
dG J.W dG J.I dG:> J.Y dG + j.G"
From economic theory one would expect that K' j ,w > 0, K' j , r < 0,
K'j,Y> 05 and K'j,G > «) 0 for private capital to be complementary
(substitutive) with public capital. Because dt/dG is as a matter of
course zero the term K'j,t·(dt/dG) vanishes; K'j,t is < (» 0 as
technical progress is capital saving (using). In deriving equation
(6) we' assumed that the exogenous variables Z = w,r,Y depend on
other exogenous variables x1,x2' •. ' which we do not consider
explicitly, and possibly also upon G, that is, Z = Z(xl,x2, •• ,G).
dYj/dG shows how the output of industry j is directly affected by an
increase in demand for government capital and K'j,y·CdYj/dG) is the
associated response of the capital stock in industry j. This effect
is probably strongest in the construction industry because about 80%
of government investment outlays are in buildings and other
construction, especially roads and bridges. We assume that there is
no direct response of the wage rate in industry j, that is dWj/dG =
o and direct our attention on the two remaining effects which are of
far greater interest. drj/dG indicates the response of the user cost
of private capital in industry j to an increase in government
investment. The user cost of capital is given bYt see Jorgenson
(1963):6
(7) r = PI. ( R
B + 6. _ dPI j )
j J J dt
5
cSj is the depreciation rate, PIj is the price index o,f private
capital goods in industry j and Rs is the interest rate. Assuming 6j
and PIj to be unaffected by government investment reduces the
response of the user cost of capital to drj/dG = PIj . (dRs/dG) .
K'v denotes the partial derivative of the demand for
private capital with respect to the variable v.
6 At the present stage of research, no taxes are
incorporated in the user cost of capital. This
problem will be dealt with in future research.
6According to the standard neoclassical model (lump sum) tax financed
government expenditures,leave the interest rate unaffected whereas
deficit financed pUblic expenditures result in an increase in
interest rates. 7 Thus the total effect K'j,r·PIj·(dRB/dG) is either
zero - in the case of tax financing - or negative - in the case of
deficit spending - in which case we get the usual 'crowding out'
effect. Arguing within a standard IS-LM model with interest rate and
income dependent private investment, increasing the pUblic capital
stock either by tax or debt financing directly affects the private
capital stock according to K'j,y·(dYj/dG). However, if this
investment is deficit financed the positive response is at least
partially offset by the crowding out ,effect which makes dKj/dG
smaller in the case of deficit spending.
In order to concentrate on the core of the problem under dispute we
surpress the potential effect of public investment on income, wage,
technical progress and the price of private capital goods in which
case equation-(6) boils down to:






The traditional pUblic economics literature considers only the first
.effect, that is the possibility of private capital to be crowded out
by additional deficit financed government investment. In the
standard model of budget deficits, see Barro (1989), a budget
deficit leads to an increase in the rea~-interestrate which crowds
out private investment resulting in a smaller stock of private
productive capital. However, th~ hypothesis is strongly challenged
by the Ricardian equivalence theorem according to which tax payers
anticipate future increases in taxes to pay for the public debt.
Because the present value of the future tax payment equals the
current budget deficit,o tax payers are indifferent about tax and
deficit financing of current additional pUblic e~penditure.
Consequently, present saving is adjusted regardless of the financing
decision of the government and therefore the interest rate is
unaffected by deficit spending. Barro (1989) in surveying the
7 Note that if dRB/dG > a the term K*drj/dG would have
to be appended to equation (5), whicn is a direct cost
increasing effect (affecting the existing capital stock),
wher~as K'j,rdrj/dG is an indirect effect (affecting
net lnvestment demand only).
7empirical evidence concludes that most findings are in support of
the Ricardian equivalence theorem, that is that government deficits
leave interest rates unaffected. This result refers not only to the
U. S. economy. Evans (1987) presents results with the same
implications for the six largest OECD countries. The countries
covered by Evans include also West Germany. We updated Evans' data
and reestimated one of his equations and arrived at the same
conclusions, that is, lack of empirical evidence on a positive
correlation between government deficits and interest reates. 8
Despite the fact that the pUblic, politicans and many economists
believe that budget deficits raise nominal interest rates, arguments
in favour of this hypothesis are both on theoretical as well as on
empirical reasons rather poor, that is dRB/dG is virtually zero.
Consequently, the effect of pUblic investment expenditures depend
crucially on the question wether public capital is a substitute for
or complementary to private capital. Tatom (1991) distinguishes
between direct and indirect effects of pUblic capital on the
performance of the private economy. Directly, pUblic infrastructure
capital provides important intermediate services to private firms,
that is, like increasing private inputs an increase in the provision
of pUblic capital leads to an increase in private output.
Technically speaking, the Lj-Kj isoquant in the production function
Yj = f(Lj,Kj,t,G) shifts inward if G is increased. Indirect effects
arise because an increase in pUblic infrastructure capital provides
an incentive for private firms to increase the demand for private
capital because a larger stock of pUblic capital raises the rate of _
return on private capi~a~:. This line of reasoning, subsumed under
the heading 'public capital hypothesis', suggests that pUblic and
private capital are complementary, that is, K'j,G > 0 and
8 We reestimated Evans' model by running the regression
stated in footnote 5 and tabulated in table 8 of Evans'
text. Equation (6) of Evans' text could not be estimated
because we did not have consistent data on the six-month
Eurocurrency interest rate available for the complete
observation period. Evans estimates cover the period
74.11 - 85.IV, whereas our estimate ranges from 74.1 -
89.IV resulting in (figures in parentheses are t-values):
it - i t - 1 = 1.695 UGt -0.651 UDt - 0.138 UMt
(2.1) (0.5) (1.7)
(We use the notation of Evans). According to the crowding
out hypothesis, the coefficient on the nominal budget
-deficit variable, UDt, should be significantly positive,
whereas we as well as Evans estimate an insignificant
negative coefficient!
8consequently dKj/dG > o.
Even if the crowding out effect is working, that is additional
pUblic investment expenditures raise interest rates,_dKj/dG can be
positive if pUblic and private capital are complements and this
complementary effect outweights the crowding out effect resulting in
a net crowding in of private investment. Otherwise the crowding out
effect would at least be partially compensated. However, if both
types of capital are substitutes, dKj/dG is always negative in which
case one might speak of a technologically induced crowding out of
private capital.




L '. dWj + ' dr . I dY. , L· __ J + L· y__ J + L· G'
J.ti dG J.r dG J. dG J.
From economic theory one would expect that L'j,w < 0, L'j,r > 0,
K'j,Y> 0 and for private labour to be complementary (substitutive)
with public capital we have L'j,G > «) o. The above dicussion with
respect to the effect of pUblic capital on the demand for private
capital also applies to the demand of labour and thus we need not
repeat the arguments.
In order to reach final conclusions with respect to the impact debt
or tax financed additional pUblic investment expenditures have on
the economy one has"to turn to empirical research because it is
rather speculative to say something a priori about the various
effects involved, that means we have to derive an empirical
equivalent to equations (6) and (8).
3 Data description and econometric specification
For estimation, we apply our econometric model to a panel of 31 2-
digit industries9 of the manufacturing sector of the ~est German
economy using annual data for the period 1970 - 1989. In order to
eliminate effects that might arise from the granting of subsidies
and the payment of indirect taxes, we used real (at 1980 prices) net
.value added instead of real gross value added to measure industry
9 These 31 industries cover the total manufacturing
industry with the exception of the mineral oil refining
industry. Due to profit transfer via transfer prices this
industry has a negative net value added throughout most
of the observation period.
9output Yj . Labour input is measured by the total number of working
hours of white and blue collar workers. The wage rate has been
calculated by dividing the total wage bill by the total number of
hours worked. The stock of private capital is measured by the total
net capital stock, evaluated at 1980 prices. The user cost of
private capital has been calculated using formula (7) stated above.
Rs is the interest rate (mid-year values) on bonds, PIj the price
index for private investment goods and 8j the depreciation rate. As
a matter of course, all data - except Rs - have been calculated
industry-specific. 10
Next we turn to the pUblic capital stock data. 11 Table 1 presents
summary statistics on the composition of the non-military pUblic
capital stock (net, evaluated at 1980 prices) in West Germany by
eight different functions for the years 1961, 1970, 1980 and 1989.
The categorization of the government capital by function presented
in table 1 is rather close to the categorization used by the OECD
for reporting government expenditures. 'Traffic, transportation and
communication' and 'community services and pollution abatement'
account for more that 50% of the total pUblic capital stock.
However, the share of the 'traffic, transport and communication'
capital stock is stagnating whereas the share of public capital
invested in 'community services and pollution' is still growing.
Table 1 also reports annual growth rates for the four selected
years. The aver~ge growth rate of the pUblic capital stock decreased
from 6.5% in 1970 to about 1.4% in 1989. The net stock of pUblic
capital invested in education has even decreased since 1983 which
reflects the fact that since about 1980 virtually no more new
schools and universities have been constructed.
Within the 'infrastructure literature' different concepts to measure
public capital have been applied. Some researchers use the total
stock of public capital, such as for example Nadiri and Mamuenas
(1991) and Morrison and Schwartz (1992), whereas others use the
concept of the 'core infrastructure', which comprises public capital
10 We acknowledge support by Dr. Georg Erber, German
Institute of Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, who kindly
provided us with the data. For a detailed description
of the data used in this study see Erber and Haid (1989).
11 These data too have been provided by the DIW, which
makes annual reports on the structure of government
capital within the regular 'Strukturberichterstattung'
(Report on the structure of the [German] Economy).
10Table 1: The stock of Government Capital in West Germany
By Function (Net capital stock at 1980 prices).1)
1961 1970 1980 1989
%-shares (annual growth rates)
G1 General PUblic Services, 10.8 7.3 6.3 6.5
Public Order and Savety (2.98) (5.10) (3.38) (1.75)
G2 Education 19.8 21.8 21.9 18.8
(7.94) (6.52) (1.60) (-0.06)
G3 Health 9.4 7.7 7.0 7.5
(3. 69) (4.16) (3.65) (2.44)
G4 Social security and Welfare 3.8 2.7 2.5 2.5
(3.67) (2.19) (2.20) (1.56)
Gs Housing and community 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.5
Development (2.75) (5.48) (7.48) (6.03)
G6 Community services and 15.0 15.1 15.7 17.1
poLlution Abatement (6.13) (5.97) (4.80) (2.40)
G7 Traffic, Transportation and 32.7 40.0 37.5 37.3
Communication (6.85) (7.88) (3.51) (1.42)
Ga Recreation and Culture, Agri-
culture, Forestry and Fishing, 6.6 7.1 8.0 8.6
Other Economic Affairs (7.27) (6.49) (4.63) (1.93)
Total Public capital Stock2) 284.1 560.7 890.4 1060.0
(6.08) (6.50) (3.38) (1.41)
1) Source: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) ,
Berlin. The first line of figures indicate the share
of the various types of pUblic capital on the total
pUblic capital stock; the second line with figures in
parentheses the growth rate compared to the previous year.
2) Total net capital stock in bill. of OM at 1980 prices.
11capital in form of higways, airports, mass transit, electric and gas
plants, telecommunications, water supply facilities and sewers, see
'for example Berndt and Hansson (1991) and Conrad and seitz (1991,
1992). Aschauer (1989a,b) examines the total military and non-
military public capital stock and Deno (1988) considers 3 different
kinds of pUblic infrastructure simultaneously placing however severe
zero restrictions on the parameter estimates to avoid multi-
collinearity problems. Seitz (1992), in a study of the economic
effects of the public road network, used physical data on the length
of the motorway network measured in km. with respect to the
quantification of pUblic capital data there is a remarkable
difference between the 'new infrastructure research' and the
infrastructure research in the area of regional economics. Whereas
the former uses almost exclusively 'monetary' data the latter almost
exclusively uses data measured physically such as the length of the
motorway network or measures of accessibility of certain types.. of
infrastructure, see for example the survey by Rietveld (1989). We
examine two different concepts of the pUblic capital stock: the
total pUblic capital stock and a 'core infrastructure' capital stock
derived by aggregating the components Gs' G6 and G7 documented in
table 1.12
To implement our model empirically we use a 'Generalized Leontief'
cost function which can be considered to be an approximation to any
arbitrary cost function. The 'Generalized Leontief' is a flexible
functional form and permits, unlike the Cobb-Douglas function wich
is usually chosen by researchers using the 'production function
approach', both substitutive as well as complementary relations
between the inputs involved, see for example Chambers (1988). Thus
we specify the cost function to be estimated as:
12 In an earlier version of this paper we examined the
-eight different types of pUblic capital, G1 , •• , Ge,
covered in table 1. However, the Gi series are higply
correlated which made the estimation of the cost
function (1) with all capital categories included
impossible because of multicollinearity problems.
Meaningful estimates could only be derived at the
expense of imposing rather severe zero restrictions on
parameters. In order to cope with the mUlticollinearity
problem we had to take a rather pragmatic approach, that
is estimate the cost function (1) for each category of
public capital seperately. The earlier version of this
paper with results on the eight different categories of
public capital is available upon request by the author.
12+ I}WyWj~·5 + I}rYIj~·5+ I}wtWjtO.5
+ I}rtIi~0.5 + (Wj + I j ) (l}yYj + Ptt
+ 2I}yt(Yj t)0.5)] + ~.5[PwGWjGO.5
+ PXGIjGO.5 + (Wj + I j ) (I}YG (YjG) 0.5
+ I}w(tG)0.5)] + (Wj ~ Ij)PGG + i~lYCjDj
Using Shephard's Lemma cost minimizing conditional demand functions
for private capital and labour can be derived:
(3a') * K· ]
K(W,I, t,Y,G,Dj ); Db') * L· ]
For lac)c of space equations (3a' ) and (3b' ) are not cast into
parametric forms; these can easily be recovered from (10). The cost
function (10) together with the two input demand functions (3a') and
(3b') are estimated using iterative seemingly unrelated regression.
Befause we are dealing with a panel data set each equation is
appended with industry specific dummies, that is, we estimate a
system of equations with fixed effect, see for ex~mple Hsiao (1986).
YCj' j = 1,..31, is the industry j specific fixed effect in the cost
function, OJ is a dummy variable taking on the value 1.0 in industry
j and 0 otherwise. In order to ensure that both the labour as well
as the capital demand equations with fixed effects can still be
consistently derived from the cost function (10) the coefficients on
the the variables Wj and rj' Bwj and Brj , have to be specified
industry specific. These parameters enter the factor demand
equations as constant terms taking on the role of industry specific
fixed effects. Thus our approach is close to that ta~en by Nadiri
and Mamuenas (1991), who use a cross section of 12 U. S. industries,
and Morrison and Schwartz (1992), who pooled data on the
manufacturing industry of the 48 contiguous U. S. states. However,
compared to most of the empirical studies, our cost function does
not impose any a priori homogenity restrictions on the parameters of
the cost function, especially the property of constant returns to
scale. We will test for this assumption, that is examine whether the
restrictions BwY = Bry = By = BYt = BYG = 0 are jointly compatible
with the data. We did not impose any zero restrictions on.the
13parameters in any of our estimates; for both the total as well as
the 'core infrastructure' pUblic capital stock the cost function as
stated in equation (10) together with the two input demand functions
have been estimated.
Before we turn to reporting our results a final question has to be
addressed. Most researchers in the infrastructure literature
incorporate the public capital stock data - lagged one period - in
an adjusted form by multiplying the public capital stock data with
the capacity utilization rate of the industry under consideration,
see for example Berndt and Hansson (1991). This practice is based on
the argument that there is strong empirical evidence, see Nadiri and
Mamuneas (1991), that the intensity of the usage of pUblic capital
by private fims varies systematically over the business-cycle. We
used the pUblic capital stock data in both the unadjust~d form as
well as the adjusted form, that is by multiplying the infrastructure
data with the capacity utilization rate of the industry using both
times the data on G with a one period lag. For lack of space we
present results only for the capacity adjusted pUblic capital stock
data because this model performed much better. However, in passing
we will briefly state results derived from the model with the
unadjusted data.13
4 -.pirical Results
Table 2 presents the estimates derived using the total pUblic
capital stock data; the results using the core infrastructure do not
differ that dramatically and for lack of space we refrain from
presenting these results. with the exception of BtG all of the
estimated parameters are significant and the goodness-of-~it
statistics 'are rather satisfactory if we take into account that we
apply our model to a panel data set14• Table 2 also presents
13 The adjustment of the pUblic capital stock data with the
industry specific capacity utilization rate gives more
'structure' to the pUblic capital data. In the
unadjusted form, the data varies only over time whereas
in the adjusted form we also have variation accross
industries.
14 BtG is insignificant also in the model using the core
infrastructure variable. However, in the model with the
unadjusted data, BtG is significantly positive both in
the model with the total as well as the core infra-
structure pUblic capital stock.
14Table 2: Results of the panel-estimation for 31 industries
over the period 1970 - 1989 using the total stock
of pUblic capital. I )
B. 0.03147 ( 2.0) By -1.341"10-6
( 5.1)
JW
Bjr 0.25031 C 2.0) B t 0.00077 ( 5.5)
Bwr 0.00715 ( 3.4) Byt 2.294"10-5
( 4.8)
B WY 0.00050 ( 3.9) B WG 0.00923 ( 4.4)
Bry 0.00234 ( 5.1) BrG 0.06236 ( 5.7)
Bwt -0.01982 ( 8.8) BtG 0.00035 ( 1.7)
Brt -0.06791 ( 8.2) BYG -6.897"10-5
( 6.9)
BG -0.00023 ( 3.1)
Cost Equation: -2 0.. 990 R =
Labour Demand Equation: R 2= 0.809
Capital Demand Equation: -2 0.633 R =
Log of Likelihood function: -12.757.3










1) t-ratios in parenthesis.
The total number of observations are t[=20]"n[=31] = 620.
The 'fixed-effects' parameters Yj are not reported. Note,
that Bjw and Bjr are estimated inaustry specific. The
figures reported are average values.
2) LR indicates Likelihood-Ratio test-statistics, which
follow a chi-square with degress of freedom as indicated in
parentthesis.
LRo: Tests the model with fixed-effects against the model
without industry-specific dummies.
L~: Tests the model inclusive the variable G against
the model exclusive of G, with industry-specific
dummies specified in each model. This statistic tests
for the overall significance of the variable G.
LRH: Tests the assumption of constant resturns to
scale in the cost function.
The associated probability values for all tests are 0.0000.
15various specification tests15 • The likelihood-ratio statistic LRD
tests the significance of the assumed industry-specific fixed-
effects. The test-statistic indicates strongly that the model with
fixed-effects outperforms a corresponding model that does not
include sector-specific dummies. In addition, we calculated the
likelihood-ratio statistic L~ which tests the model including the
variable G against the model without the pUblic capital stock
variable. with these test statistics we can assess the overall
significance of the variable G. As the individual t-test statistics,
L~ supports the hypothesis that the pUblic infrastructure variable
enters significantly the cost, labour demand and capital demand
equation. Because some researchers impose the assumption of constant
returns to scale whereas we did not impose this assumption, we
calculated the likelihood-ratio test-statistics LRH which indicates
a strong rejection of this hyphosesis. All tests performed equally
well when using the core infrastructure public capital stock as well
as the unadjusted pUblic capital stock data.
Now we turn to the inspection of the economic implications of our
estimates. The estimated average shadow price of the total pUblic
capital stock is 0.00218 that means, increasing G by one DM
decreases private cost by 0.00218 DM; for the core infrastructure
variable the average shadow price has been estimated to be 0.00364.
Public capital and private capital have been estimated to be
complementary and pUblic capital and private labour to be
substitutes which is in accordance to results reported throughout
the literature, with the exception of Nadiri and Mamuenas (1991).
The average elasticity of the demand for private capital with
respect to the total pUblic capital stock is ~K,G = 0.3597 and for
private labour ~L,G = -0.1552. In the core infrastructure model the
corresponding elasticities are: ~K,G = 0.3613 and ~L,G = -0.1376. Our
estimates are far lower than those reported by other researchers,
such as for example by Berndt and Hanson (1991) who estimate ~K,G =
0.86 and ~L,G = -0.60 using a 'core infrastructure' capinal stock
variable.
We continue the economic interpretation of our results by taking a
closer look at the effects of the provision of pUblic capital on the
15 Because all of the applied tests are nowadays standard
in applied econometrics, we refrain from a detailed
discussion of these tests and refer the reader to the
literature, see for example Greene (1990).
16demand for private inputs. To examine the response of the demand for
private capital to factor prices, output and public capital we have
to cast equation (6) in our theoretical section into a form which
makes it possible to assess the quantitative importance of the
various effects involved empirically. This we achieve by
differentiating (3a') with respect to time casting the resulting






dw dr dY dG
"~+,, dt+" 1.+" dt+" ~ Kw W Kr r Kt t KY Y KG G
= We + r e + t e + ye + G e
(12) aK*
"KZ = az z
K*
for Z =w,r, t, y,G
denoting the capital demand elasticities of the varies variables
involved. An equation analogous to (11) can also be derived for the
demand for labour which for lack of space we refrain from
displaying.
Equation (11) is our empirical counterpart to equation (6) in
section II. This equation decomposes the observed adjustment of
the private capital stock into a wage, we, user cost of capital,
r e , output, ye, pUblic capital, Ge , and 'technical progress', t e ,
effect. casting equation (6) into an empirical form would have
required the estimation of a complete system of equations of the
form Z = Z(xl' x2 ' • ,G) - with xl' x2 ' •• denoting other exogenous
variables - for all variables that are exogenous in our model, that
is Z = w,r,Y. This is far beyond the scope of the present study.
However, by examining the empirical estimates of the factor demand
elasticities and the effects evaluated in equation (11) we are able
to access the quantitative importance of the various- exogenous
variables for the adjustment of private capital.
Figures 1 to 4 present the result using the total pUblic capital
stock on the decomposition of the adjustment of the demand for
private capital and labour as derived from equation (11). Table 3
presents summary statistics of the results obtained from using the
total as well as the core infrastructure capital stock. The results
differ only slightly and therefore we direct our attention on the
effects of the total pUblic capital stock. The effect of technical
progress has been calculated by the residual method, that is we
17Decomposition Of Private Capital
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'IlK,w = - 'Il K,r 0.037 0.037




r e - 0.058 - 0.057
ye 1.178 1.175
Ge 1.271 1.274
t e - 1.441 - 1.440
Labour Demand Equation
'IlL,w = - 'IlL,r - 0.093 - 0.093
'IlL,Y 0.785 0.777
'IlL,G - 0.155 - 0.138
we - 0.059 - 0.060
r e 0.040 0.039
I
ye 1.071 1.064
Ge - 0.450 - 0.394\
t e - 2.628 - 2.477
1) Reported are t~e average values for the period 1971 - 1989
across all industries.
20solved equation (11) for t e . 16 First note, that both for labour as
well as private capital the contribution of the provision of public
capital, Ge , is rather steadily decreasing, see figure 1 and 2,
which is mostly due to decreasing growth rates of the pUblic capital
stock. Changes in output are the most important determinants of the
demand for private factors of production, see figure 3 and 4. The
wage effect, we, both on private capital as well as labour is also
steadily decreasing which might be due to growing legal restrictions
associated with the hiring and firing of workers suggesting that
labour, more than capital, might be a fixed factor in production.
The user cost of capital effect, r e , is highly volatile accross the
business cycle. Its mean absolute value is smaller than the average
impact pUblic capital has on the demand for private capital and
labour. In most years, the effects of changes in the user cost of
capita~ - which are mainly caused by changes in the interest rate
and changes in the price of private capital goods - partially offset
the positive effect public capital has on private capital formation.
However, theoretical considerations (Ricardian equivalence theory)
and the evidence collected by Evans (1987), which has been verified
by us, as well as the rather small impact the user cost of capital
has on the demand for private investment suggests that there is
little room for a crowding our effect to work. Figure 5 puts forward
another interesting result which might be of practical importance:
This figure shows the normalized - that is mean zero and standard
deviation equal to one - values of the output, wage, capital cost
and government capital effects on the demand for private capital.
All effects, except: the government capital effect, are highly
volatile over the business cycle whereas the government capital
effect is rather smooth. This suggests that public investment has a
'stabilizing' or 'smoothing' effect on private investment; however
this stabilizing effect has become steadily smaller due to low
pUblic capital formation.
Finally, Table 4 summarizes industry specific estimates of output
and pUblic capital elasticities on the demand for private capital
and labour. The elasticities vary dramatically accross the different
industries. The smallest effects of the provision of pUblic capital
on the demand for private capital has been found in the road vehicle
and in the mechanical engineering industry and the largest effect in
the aircraft/spacecraft industry. with respect to labour in many
16 Thus, t e absorbs all estimation errors. For this reason
we refrain from depicting t e in figures 1 to 5.
21Normalized Series: 'Public Capital'-,
'Wage'-, 'Output'- And 'Capital Cost'-
Effects On Private Capital Demand.
user cost effect
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Figure 5Table 4: Output and Public Capital Elasiticities of the
demand for private capital and labour in different
industries.
TlK,Y l1K,G l1 L , Y l1 L ,G
stones/Earths 0.924 0.169 0.821 -0.155
Iron and Steel 0.922 0.116 0.800 -0.118
Non-ferrous metal 0.801 0.294 0.587 -0.015
Foundries ..\ 0.726 0.409 0.732 -0.110
Non-ferrous metal foundries 0.813 0.183 1.171 -0.283
Drawing plants/cold rolling mills 0.527 0.264 0.902 -0.302
Chemical" industry 0.816 0.070 0.910 -0.282
Wood working 0.293 0.397 0.815 -0.242
Manufacture of pulp and paper 0.746 0.241 0.667 -0.157
Rubber products 0.753 0.405, 0.702 -0.020
Transformation of metals 0.782 0.359 0.727 -0.042
Structural metal products 0.926 0.442 0.838 -0.058
Mechanical engineering 1.055 0.132 0.753 -0.277
Road vehicles 1.124 0.105 0.804 -0.012
Shippbuilding 0.733 0.382 0.884 -0.242
Aircraft/spacecraft 0.830 0.824 0.741 -0.001
Electrical engineering 1.107 0.141 0.655 -0.321
Precision/optical instruments 0.869 0.491 0.741 -0.046
Tools and finished metal goods 0.884 0.235 0.838 -0.132
Office machinery/computers 0.674 0.335 0.565 -0.010
Musical instruments/toys 0.723 0.647 0.770 -0.136
Ceramic goods 0.843 0.638 0.917 -0.297
Glas industry 0.846 0.310 0.662 -0.079
Manufacture of wood products 0.934 0.301 0.846 -0.067
Processing of pUlp and paper 0.722 0.320 0.696 -0.052
printing and duplication 1.050 0.292 0.774 -0.087
Plastic products 0.939 0.262 0.800 -0.071
Leather/shoes 1.064 0.654 0.657 -0.121
Textiles 0.627 0.194 0.874, -0.082
Clothing 0.401 0.201 0.841 -0.042
Food/beverag7s/tobacco 0.857 0.105 0.838 -0.215
Industry Average 0.796 0.359 0.785 -0.155
23industries the impact of public capital has been estimated to be
very small. The rather large differences of pUblic capital effects
across industries suggest that pUblic investmest in not neutral with
respect to the industry structure. The estimated marked differences
of the impact of public infrastructure on the various sectors of the
economy are in accordance with evidence reported in the
infrastructure literature within the area of urban and regional
economics, see for example Blum (1982) and Biehl (1986).
5 Summary and Conclusions
This study investigated the impact of the provision of public
capital on the demand for pri vate...l capital and labour. In our
theorectical discussion we examined the effects of debt vs. tax
financing of pUblic investment by applying simple comparative
statics on conditional factor demand functions arguing that the
effect of additional public investment on private investment demand
crucially depends on whether private and pUblic capital are
substitutes or complements. We refered to the Ricardian equivalence
theorem which raises arguments against a positive correlation
between deficit financing and interest rates. Empirical results
presented in the literature in support of the Ricardian equivalence
theorem as well as own estimates have been shortly dealt with. In
the empirical section we presented evidence on the impact of pUblic
capital on private production cost as well as on the demand for
private factors of production. Our estimates revealed rather small
price elasticities of the factor demand functions, leaving only
small room for a crowding out effect to work, but rather strong
effects of output and less stronger and decreasung effects of the
provision of pUblic capital on private labour and capital. Private
and public capital have been estimated to be complementary, that is
pUblic capital crowds in private capital, and for pUblic capital and
private labour a substitutive relation resulted. However, we found
rather dramatic differences on the impact of pUblic capital on
labour and capital demand accross the 31 2-digit which suggests that
government capital formation has a considerable impact on the
structure of the' private economy.
A severe drawback of the approach presented is that because of the
lack of availability of data on material and energy usage in 2-digit
industries, we could consider only two private inputs, namely
capital and labour. A further methodical shortcoming is that we did
not consider a potential simultaneity bias in our estimation because
24one should expect that output and factor prices are not exogenous.
However, the data set available to us covers only a small set of
variables which makes the application of instrumental variables
techniques rather problematic if one does not want to rely
exclusively on lagged values of the variables in question. Thus, a
more richer industry data set should be collected in which also
other inputs, such as raw materials and enery, should are covered
and which provides data on other industry specific variables to be
used as instrumental variables.
Further research should be directed to incorporate the fact that
firms pay for the provision of pUblic infrastructure facilities by
taxes. Such an extension, both theoretically as well as empirically,
could open new avenues for research on the impact of tax vs. deficit
financing of public investment expenditures. Another promissing
field for future research could be an improved measurement of pUblic
intermediate inputs. Most researchers consider only the benefits
related to the stock of public capital, but public output like
private input is produced by combining labour, capital and
intermediates. Thus, to measure the benefits related to pUblic
services one would have to find a measure for public output and
incorporate this measure into private cost or production functions
which could probably be achieved by using hedonic pUblic output
concepts.
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